







































We study the basic economic problem of choice between long-term and short-
term commitments under a general characterization of uncertainty (aggregate
uncertainty). When contingencies are contractible, a perfect market of Arrow-
Debreau contingent claims implements the social optimum. When contingencies
are not contractible, long-term commitments receive too much weight in
individual portfolios. The economy as a whole is too rigid during periods of high
aggregate shocks. The model links a rigidity bias with the operation of the price
mechanism and the monetary system.
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Talouden liiallinen jäykkyys




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pitkien ja lyhyiden sijoitusten välistä valintatilannetta
yleisen epävarmuuden vallitessa. Talous saavuttaa sosiaalisen hyvinvoinnin kan-
nalta parhaan mahdollisen tasapainon, mikäli Arrow’n-Debreaun futuurimarkkinat
toimivat täydellisesti. Mikäli futuurimarkkinat toimivat epätäydellisesti, talouden
toimijat suosivat sosiaalisen hyvinvoinnin kannalta liian suuressa määrin maturi-
teetiltaan pitkiä sijoituksia. Tästä seuraa, että kansantalous on liian jäykkä koh-
datessaan voimakkaita sokkeja. Talouden liika jäykkyys liittyy hintamekanismin
sekä rahoitusjärjestelmän toimintaan.
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1 Introduction
Reconsider the basic economic problem of choice in between long-term and short-
term commitments. An entrepreneur faces this problem when planning investment
projects, a worker when considering terms of employment, and a banker/financier
when planning the maturity composition of a financial portfolio. A defining
characteristic of a long-term commitment is that it cannot be costlessly broken on
short notice. It may be passed on to others, but someone needs to bear it.
Is it feasible to think that, in market economies, these choices are governed by
the ‘invisible hand’ of the market to the best interests of the average man? In
accordance with classical welfare economics, the optimal outcome can, indeed, be
reached with a perfect Arrow-Debreau contingent claims market. We argue,
however, that in the realistic scenario where a contingent claims market is not
operational, people tend to place too much weight on long-term commitments at a
cost to maneuverability of short-term contingencies. Too much weight on long-
term commitments leads to excess ‘rigidity’ on aggregate, and too little
‘liquidity’, contemporaneously reallocable resources, when unforeseen
contingencies arise.
The proof of this rigidity bias is that, for individuals, the desirability of any
short-term asset depends on the expected price of liquid wealth at its maturity.
Even if the spot market for liquid wealth is perfect, still the market clearing price
of liquidity must at times fall short of the marginal benefit gained from its use.
The reason is that aggregate demand is sometimes dampened by individual budget
constraints. The expected market price of liquid wealth must, then, fall short of
the expected marginal benefit of its use. The bias towards rigidity is an optimal
response of individuals to this rational expectation.
The idea that the liquidity creation mechanism is biased from the social
optimum, is not novel. Among the pioneering studies of liquidity creation are
Bryant’s (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) studies of banking,
Bhattacharya and Gale’s (1989) study on the operation of inter bank markets, and
Holmström and Tirole’s (1998) study of the role of the public sector.
1 These and
other contributions in the genre show how an imperfect contracting environment,
brought about by non observable states and/or actions, leads to deviations from
the ideal Arrow-Debreau contingent claims equilibrium of classical welfare
economics. The resulting ‘second best’ equilibria correspond with observed
phenomena in financial systems.
                                                
1 Other examples of this are Freixas and Parigi (1997) on payment systems, Allen and Gale (2001)
on systemic risk, Diamond and Rajan (2001) on banking, Rochet and Vives (2002) on LOLR, and
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) on the role of sterilization in monetary policy. Kiyotaki and
Moore (eg 1997 and 2001) utilise an alternative approach based on the assumption of constrained
actions.8
The intuition of why contracting issues are important for policy is that, in the
absence of a perfect contracting environment, it matters who controls wealth.
From this premise, it is possible to explain why depositors have powers of
immediate withdrawal, even though these powers make financial systems prone to
bank runs (See eg Diamond and Dybvig 1983 and Diamond and Rajan 2001).
Also, it is possible to explain why a central banking arrangement may lead to a
superior allocation of liquidity compared with an inter bank market (Bhattacharya
and Gale 1987). Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) argue that the special ability
of central banks to promote wealth transfers across borders is key to
understanding the transmission mechanism of central bank sterilization
operations. The approach holds promise of bridging the gap in between monetary
policy theory, which traditionally pays no attention to financial systems issues,
and central banking practise.
Deviations from the classical assumptions of perfect contractibility come at
the cost of analytical complexity. For tractability, models in this genre are
typically staged in a single good economy with three periods, the minimum to
enable differentiation of short and long-term assets. Also the state space is
truncated to reduce the number of possible contingencies. Much of the literature
on liquidity creation pertains to the special case of aggregate certainty, or
aggregate uncertainty in the very restricted sense that all agents experience the
same contingency. While the assumptions about a three stage economy and a
truncated state space may at first sight appear purely technical matters, they in
effect reduce the challenges related to contracting in the models and thus,
potentially, hide important policy issues.
Our contribution to the literature is to extend the state space to normal
dimensions to allow for real aggregate uncertainty under non-contractibility of
states. A problem with an extended state space comparable to the one used in this
paper has been studied previously by Holmström and Tirole in their theory on
asset prices (2001). In their model, states are contractible but asset returns are not
fully pledgeable: the challenge of liquidity creation is less than full pledgeability
of long-term investment returns. In contrast to Holmström and Tirole, we study
the case of non contractible states. Surprisingly (at least to us), a study of this case
suggests that contractibility problems lead to a rigidity bias in an economy, even if
returns of the long-term technology are fully pledgeable.
In the following chapter, we at first study the allocation of wealth by a single
agent in between long and short-term assets. The single agent is then replaced by
a continuum of agents, whose situation is studied from the point of view of a
social planner. The benevolent social planner’s solution gives a benchmark for an
analysis of the situation, where the actions of agents are governed by the invisible
hand of the price mechanism. In the final chapters, we discuss the issues of
forwards markets, a different class of target functions, and aggregate certainty.9
We also present our views on the links of the model with the development of
monetary systems, and the agenda for further research.
2 The liquidity problem
We proceed to solve a problem by a single agent concerning allocation of wealth
in between short-term storage and long-term commitments. The relationship of
our formulation with earlier work is discussed at the end of this chapter, once the
basic concepts have been introduced.
There are three planning periods, t{0,1,2}, and the following order of
events:
– At t=0 one unit of perfectly divisible good is allocated in between long-term
investment L and short-term storage Z.
– In between t=0 and t=1, nature chooses a shock S from domain I = [0,1] with
cumulative distribution F and p.d. f.
– At t=1, storage is allocated to intermediate consumption C1.
– At t=2, return of long-term investment RL is allocated to final consumption
C2.
The target, ‘expected utility at t=0’ is:
   , dS S f 0 , C S max B C C
I
1 2 1     (2.1)
where B is a parameter ‘penalty’. The two parameters of relevance, return from
long-term investment and penalty, satisfy:
1 R 2 B 1 R 0      (2.2)
The p.d. is differentiable and positive throughout its domain:
 I S 0 S f    (2.3)
The ‘linear kinked’ target implies that, while agents are risk neutral locally
everywhere except in the vicinity of the kink, they are risk averse globally. The10
shock imposes a jump in agents’ marginal utility in consumption at the level of
the shock.
2
Define ‘liquidity’ as contemporaneously reallocable amount of the good. The
periodic allocation decisions of the planner are constrained by liquidity (right side
of the following equations) as follows:
I S RL C ) 2 t (
I S Z C ) 1 t (
1 Z L ) 0 t (
2
1
   
   
  
(2.4)
All decision variables {L, Z, C1, C2} are defined on the nonnegative real axis.
Solving L and C2 from the liquidity constraints, the problem becomes:
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(2.5)
Consider the solution to intermediate consumption first, given any shock
realisation. Ignore constraints (i), (iii) and (iv) for now, it is verified later that the
proposed solution does not violate them. Under parametrisation (2.2), the target is
increasing in intermediate consumption below the shock, and horizontal above it.
3
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Inserting these equilibrium values into (2.5), the planner’s problem simplifies to:
                                                
2 The shock could be interpreted as the price of the cheapest consumption bundle that feeds a
family, the price of the cheapest house, or the minimum outlay needed to finish a project etc.
3 The target is not differentiable in C1 at the ‘kink’ (C1  =  S) but one can formally derive the
equilibrium conditions for intermediate consumption by utilising the Kuhn-Tucker method locally
for the two areas separated by the kink.11
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To complete the analysis, it is verified that expected utility is positive in
equilibrium, and no constraints are violated by the proposed solution.
4
This problem is a variant of the type of problem studied in the literature on
liquidity, references of which are given in the introductory section. Among the
common factors are the three periods, the single good, the two technologies, and
that the planner receives relevant information after the initial allocation in
between the alternative technologies has been fixed. The long-term commitment
may be interpreted as a physical or a financial investment. The contingency
(shock) could be an intermediate consumption or investment need, or a
refinancing need of the long-term project (see also footnote 2).
The parameter space (2.2) is restricted to guarantee an intermediate solution
for the initial choice of technology. If the penalty were below the long-term net
return, then storage would be useless. The upper bound of penalty guarantees that
there is an incentive for some long-term investment. The rate of return of long-
term investment may be considered either stochastic or deterministic. Assumption
(2.3) about the continuity of the distribution of contingencies allows the use of
standard analytical methods to infer the solution to the choice of technology.
However, in the analysis that follows, the smoothness of the shock distribution
appears to play a deeper role than just analytical tractability. As regards the
liquidity constraints (2.4), we abstract from the possibility of consumption at t=0,
and intermediate storage at t=1, but these omissions merely economise on
notation. Also, we could allow for partial (but not full) recovery of the long-term
                                                
4 In parameter space (2.2), the right hand side of (2.8) is strictly in between zero and one. By
continuity of the shock distribution, the equilibrium value of initial reserves must also be in
between zero and one. It is then verified, that the equilibrium value of initial reserves does not
violate constraint (i) or (iv). By (2.6) it may then be verified that the equilibrium values of
intermediate consumption do not either violate (i) or (iv). In parameter space (2.2), constraint (iii)
cannot bind in equilibrium. In equilibrium, expected utility at t=0 is   dS S f S B R
1
* Z
  . By domain
of shocks, this is positive when 2R – 1 – B > 0.12
investment project at t=1. This would complicate some of the liquidity constraints,
but it would not remove the rigidity bias which is given in result 3 below.
A variety of targets have been utilised in the literature. To our knowledge,
(2.1) is a novelty. The implications of using a different target is discussed in
chapter 8.
3 The macroeconomic planning problem
In this chapter, the single agent context is abandoned in favour of a continuum of
individuals i, iI, each with unit mass. Individual investment, reserves and
consumption are denoted by l[i], z[i], ct[i] respectively, and the shock of any
individual is s[i]. Denote by s a vector of individual shocks (one shock for each
agent), randomly chosen by nature from II, with cumulative distribution Fs and
p.d. fs.
5
This chapter considers the p.o.w. of a benevolent social planner: the analysis
gives a benchmark for assessment of how the economy behaves in the absence of
one. The benevolent social planner’s objective is the expected average utility of
agents:




s 1 2 1 ds s f 0 , i c i s max B i c i c (3.1)
For the benevolent social planner, liquidity constraints and non negativity
conditions hold only at the aggregate level.
To facilitate comparison of this ‘macroeconomic planning problem’ with the
liquidity problem, redefine L, Z and C as average investment, reserves, and
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Finally, redefine F as the cumulative probability distribution of the average shock.
Denote by V a variable from the unit line, and by v an (infinite) vector of
                                                
5 The sample space has one dimension for agents and one for shocks.13
variables, with v[i]I as the variable in position i. Assumption (2.3) about
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. This notation about sets is used also elsewhere in the
paper.
Certain other smoothness assumptions about the joint probability distribution
are also utilised for derivation of the results of this paper (These are needed in
connection with the proofs only). Denote by i some given agent in the sample (to
be considered a constant and not a variable in the calculations). The shock
generating mechanism implies that the cumulative probability of idiosyncratic
shocks of some agent i at some shock value x is  
 
x v
s dv v f
i
. It is interesting, that
the following assumption about continuity of conditional cumulative probabilities
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The domain of the integral is the intersection of the two sets. The shock
generating mechanism also implies that the cumulative frequency of realised
shocks at some x is 
 
x i s
di. It is assumed that the cumulative shock frequency is
differentiable and increasing throughout its domain in all states:
 I I s , 1 x 0 0
x
di













After these assumptions and definitions, we will now proceed to solve the
benevolent social planner’s problem. By utilising the liquidity constraints (2.4),
and the definition of averages (3.2), the macroeconomic planning problem may be
formulated as follows:
      
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(3.6)
The following observation may be used to infer the solution. In equilibrium, given
any realisation of the shock vector, all agents need to consume on the same side of
their shocks at t=1. Else, by marginal utilities, welfare can be increased by
reallocating intermediate consumption from agents that consume more than their
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: I I s
1
1 (3.7)
Under (3.7) the following holds in all states:
        
I
1 1 0 *, C S max di 0 *, i c i s max . But then the macroeconomic planning
problem (3.6) is transformed into the liquidity problem (2.5), for which the
solution is already known.
The solution to the macroeconomic planning problem is summarised in the
following result 1. We use the support MP to indicate that the equilibrium values
refer specifically to this problem.
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To comment, the move from a single agent setting into the macroeconomic
context, is straightforward under the chosen target. The only additional
consideration that arises in the macroeconomic context is that the allocation of
liquidity at t=1 across agents must accord with (3.7). The social planner abstracts
from all other issues related to allocation of consumption across agents.
In a sense, the target is in this context consistent with the ‘equality of
opportunity’ view of the ideal society. In the model, all agents start with the same
endowment, but their proneness to shocks varies. The social planner neutralises
the consequences of the effects of these ‘born with’ differences in idiosyncratic
shock probabilities, by equalising intermediate marginal utilities in accordance
with (3.7). However, the social planner is not interested the differences in the
realised utility levels across agents.
This neglect of equality of outcomes makes the policy induced by the linear
kinked target undemanding as regards implementation. We now proceed to study,
whether this optimal policy may be implemented by a price mechanism.
4 Individual choices
In this chapter we study the situation of some given individual i. The boldface,
again, indicates that individual is not variable, but some given individual in the
sample. The following assumptions are made, part of which will be relaxed later:
Assumption 4.1 The agent does not at t=0 make any commitments as regards
liquidity allocation in t=1. This assumption is relaxed in chapter 7.
Assumption 4.2 There exists at t=1 in (almost) all states a unit price of liquidity
r[1,1+B]. It (r) is the amount the agent needs to pledge at t=1 in period t=2
liquidity to purchase one unit of period t=1 liquidity. This assumption is replaced
by an assumption about the price mechanism in chapter 5.
Assumption 4.3 The agent has rational expectations about idiosyncratic shocks
and prices of liquidity. Accordingly, the agent’s target at t=0 is expected utility
across states:
       , ds s f 0 , c s max B c c S
I I
1 2 1 

   i i i i (4.1)
where i is considered fixed and not variable (this contrasts 4.1 from the aggregate
target 3.1).16
Assumption 4.4 Agents can fully commit at t=1 to future delivery of liquidity.
Accordingly, the full set of individual liquidity constraints is:
 
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     I I s Rl c z r c ) iii (
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Non negativity of variables holds at individual level. With some manipulation, the
agent’s problem may be expressed as follows:
          

   
  
  0 c , z ) iv (
I I s 0 c z r R R ) iii (
I I s z 1
r
R
z c ) ii (
0 z 1 ) i (







c , z 1

      
     
 






i i i i
i i
(4.3)
The solution proceeds like before, so that we omit the intermediate steps. The
solution to intermediate consumption is:
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Individual demand schedules for consumption (4.4) are non increasing, and each
has a horizontal segment. Indeed, the schedule is horizontal throughout the
domain of r in some states. This horizontal segment reflects the assumption that
there is a threshold in between the marginal utilities related to the two uses of the
good: The marginal benefit of consumption is unity above the shock, and penalty
below it. Thus, whenever the price of liquidity is above unity and below the
penalty, agents want to consume up to the shock if they can. The only limiting
consideration is the liquidity constraint. Once the period t=1 liquidity constraint
binds, individual consumption becomes responsive to the price of liquidity,
because an increase in the price of liquidity lowers the liquidity constraint.17
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The integral is the expected net return of reserves (the expected penalty of
uncovered shocks, and the opportunity cost of reserves). Individual behaviour
may now be summarised:
Result 2. Under assumptions 4.1–4.4:
a) Individual agents hoard reserves at t=0 in accordance with (4.5).
b) Individual agents consume at t=1 in accordance with (4.4).
(equations not repeated to save space).
5 The price mechanism
At t=1, all liquidity is allocated to intermediate consumption. The aggregate
supply of liquidity for consumption at t=1 is, then, Z. The aggregate demand of
liquidity for consumption at t=1 (AD) is an integral of individual consumption
demands (4.4) across agents.
    
I
1 di * i c s , r AD (5.1)
Some properties of AD are stated in the following lemma for further reference.18
Lemma L1 about AD (L1.3 derived in appendix 1)
 L1.1   I I s , B 1 r r 1 s , r AD s , r AD 1 0 1 0        
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L1.3
To understand L1, recall that the price of liquidity effects demand via the period 1
liquidity constraint. L1.1 and L1.2 follow directly from the definition of the
constraint, and the domain of shocks, and their proofs are only given verbally. AD
is non increasing in r throughout its domain (L1.1), because an increase in the
price of liquidity either reduces individual liquidity constraints at t=1 (wherever
z[i] < 1) or leaves them unaffected (wherever z[i] = 1). In the interval 1  r  R,
aggregate demand is horizontal (L1.2), because then individual liquidity
constraints are at or above unity for all agents at t=1. By domain of shocks,
individual liquidity constraints cannot, then, bind anyone. It is proven in appendix
1 that when average liquidity is below unity (L1.3), then by domains of shocks
liquidity constraints must bind some agents in some states in the interval
R < r  1 + B.
Assumption (4.2) about the existence of r may now be replaced by the
assumption that, in equilibrium, aggregate demand and supply of liquidity are
equalised at the prevailing price of liquidity:
 I I s Z s *, r AD : * r     (5.2)
For illustration of the price mechanism (5.2), divide states into two groups as
follows
    
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The support CONS is shorthand for ‘some agents are liquidity constrained’, and
NCONS is ‘no one is liquidity constrained’. The following characterisation of
prices may, then, be given:19
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It is observed from (5.4) that the price of liquidity is not uniquely determined in
states characterised by S = Z. This problem may be considered insignificant as, by
continuity of F, the probability that the average shock perfectly matches the level
of aggregate reserves is nil.
The following Lemma concerns the average price of liquidity when Z < 1.
Lemma L2 about expected price of liquidity in states where there is a shortage of
it (proven in appendix 2)
   

    
Z S
s Z F 1 B 1 ds s f r 1 Z
Lemma L2 is important. It implies that the expected price of liquidity falls below
the expected marginal benefit of liquidity in the economy. The proof is that when
Z  <  1, AD schedules are downwards sloping on average in the interval
R < r < 1 + B. In a continuum of states where the average shock is ‘not much
above’ the average level of liquidity, the aggregate demand and supply schedules
must meet at the downwards sloping part of the AD schedule. By the price
mechanism, in these states, R < r* < 1 + B. From this result, it is a relatively short
step to show that, from the social point of view, not enough period t=1 liquidity is
created in this economy.20
6 Liquidity creation in equilibrium
An equilibrium is characterised by individual intermediate consumption equations
(4.4), individual initial reserve equations (4.5), and prices (5.4). It is now shown
that the equilibrium amount of initial reserves must be below the level preferred
by the benevolent social planner given in Result 1. Below, this property of the
equilibrium is first derived, and then stated formally.
As a first step of the derivation, the following lemma gives an upper bound
for the expected net return of reserves in equilibrium.
Lemma L3 an upper bound in the expected return of reserves (derived in
appendix 3)
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The following lemma states that, in a situation, where the average level of
reserves hoarded at t=0 is at or above the level preferred by the benevolent social
planner, the expected return of initial reserves is negative for all agents.
Lemma L4 about the expected return of reserves
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By definition of equilibrium (see 4.5), the net return of reserves cannot be
negative for agents if they hoard a nonzero level of them. In conclusion, the
average level of reserves cannot be at or above the solution to the macroeconomic
planning problem in equilibrium. By an analogous argument, one can rule out
zero reserves (then the expected return of liquidity would be 1 + B). It is, then,
established that the range of feasible equilibrium values is at most 0 < Z* < Z
MP*.
Result 3 Under assumptions A4.1, A4.3 and A4.4, and the price mechanism (5.3),
the range of feasible equilibrium values for reserves is at most:
a) 0 < Z* < Z
MP*.
Result 3a) is the rigidity bias. To summarize, in this economy, agents will not
hoard  ‘enough’ reserves in equilibrium from the point of view of the social
planner. Socially optimal behavior can be ruled out by the following argument. In
some states, the price of consumable goods falls below the marginal utility of
consumption for some individuals, because consumption demand is constrained
by individual liquidity constraints. This makes the expected returns of reserves, if
hoarded at the socially optimal level, negative.
Even if the socially optimal level of reserves were hoarded at t=0, equilibrium
intermediate consumption would not necessarily be identical with the solution to
the macroeconomic planning problem, because equilibrium consumption is not
always uniquely determined by the price mechanism. The two are equalised on
the following assumption:
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7 Futures markets at t=0
Results 2 and 3 utilise assumption 4.1, that agents do not at t=0 make
commitments as regards future liquidity allocation, ie that futures markets are not
active (possibly do not exist) at t=0. A market for ‘non state contingent’ claims at
t=0 cannot implement the socially optimal allocation, because implementation of
1a) requires information about shock realisations at the level of agents.
However, consider a situation where the realised vector of shocks s (the state)
is freely observable at t=1, and agents can commit at t=0 to state contingent date
t=1 liquidity transfers. Then, agents can set up a contingent claims market at t=0
for period t=1 liquidity. A contingent claim guarantees the claimant liquidity at
t=1 in state sII, but not in other states.22
Denote by  ] s [ p
1 C the unit price of a state contingent claim that returns
liquidity at t=1 to the claimant if state s is realised, and zero in other states. By
technology, the supply of liquidity at t=1 is Z in all states, so that  ] s [ p
1 C  is
determined by the following market clearing condition:
       
I
1 C I I s * Z di * s , i c : * s p
1 (7.1)
At t=0, agents choose reserves and state contingent consumption by maximising
expected utility (4.1), subject to the liquidity constraint:
          

   
I II I
s C 2 s C 1 z 1 R ds s f s p z c ds s f s p s , c
1 1 i i i i (7.2)
Solving the agents’ program, and inserting the solution to the market clearing
condition (7.1) reveals that the equilibrium in this economy accords with the
solution to the macroeconomic planning problem given in Result 1. The
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Z S if 1
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1 C (7.3)
This analysis establishes a link in between the rigidity bias and standard welfare
economics. While the first theorem in welfare economics is applicable to the case
of uncertainty when states are observable (see Arrow and Hahn 1971), the rigidity
bias arises under the key assumption of non-observability of states.
Why does a classical Arrow-Debreau futures market succeed where even a
perfect spot market for liquidity cannot? The initial endowment, and the target of
agents are naturally the same in both cases. Also the market clearing condition,
which determines the state contingent return of liquidity, is essentially the same in
both cases (just replace  ] s [ p
1 C  with r). The difference is how the liquidity
constraints are written. In this classical case, liquidity demand in any state is
effected only by the average price of consumable goods across states in
accordance with (7.2). In the absence of the futures market, there is a separate
constraint for each state.23
8 Extensions and concluding remarks
The key result in this paper is that a rigidity bias arises under aggregate
uncertainty, given non observability of shocks, and certain continuity assumptions
related to the joint distribution of shocks. The prediction of the model is that
people tend to commit to long-term projects and invest in long-term assets too
heavily, so that the economy is ‘too rigid’. To bring out the empirical implications
of the hypothesis, it is useful to restate the proof as follows.
The explanation for the rigidity bias is that, even under ideal conditions, not
enough money can be created by the private sector to equalise the price of
consumable goods with the marginal benefit of consumption under all
contingencies. During periods when the economy is hit by relatively high shocks,
some people are budget constrained while some are not. In these circumstances,
the market price of consumable goods falls below marginal benefit of
consumption of the credit constrained agents. The real insight of the model is that
this property of the price mechanism causes the rigidity bias. In anticipation of the
dampened effect of individual budget constraints on prices, people prefer to invest
long-term, at the cost that the reserve of the economy is insufficient. Special
government powers, such as the power to impose reserve requirements on agents,
are welfare improving in this economy.
The rigidity bias is derived under a linear kinked target. In that case the social
planner abstracts from issues related to allocation of consumption across agents to
a high degree. We have made some preliminary inquiries into the case of a strictly
concave utility function. In this case, the social planner is interested in ‘equality of
outcomes’ (ie equality of individual levels of utility within periods). The first best
allocation is then, not implementable by a price mechanism, because the equality
of outcomes requirement imposes an implicit price on liquidity. It appears that in
this case there are forces that bias liquidity creation in opposite directions. One is
the rigidity bias caused by the dampening effect of individual budget constraints
on prices of liquidity. The other is a ‘reserve bias’, which arises from the fact that
agents are in this case risk averse wrt period t=2 consumption. Under risk
aversion, uncertainty about the cost of covering shocks in terms of period t=2
consumption makes individuals biased towards holding large reserves.
Another interesting extension is to the case of aggregate certainty, which links
this model with mainstream liquidity models. Under aggregate certainty, and the
linear kinked target, the first best allocation is implemented by the price
mechanism if and only if agents can pledge at t=1 up to R in period t=2 returns. If
investment returns are not fully pledgeable, then the rigidity bias emerges.
In principle at least, the rigidity bias is testable by experiment in a finite
population of agents. Empirical applications of the theory to forecasting and
analysis of real economies requires a more detailed analysis about the outcome24
that will, indeed, be reached by agents. The reason that we focus on ruling out
certain outcomes, in stead of describing the equilibrium, is that the equilibrium
seems to in this economy be very dependent on circumstance (specifics of the
shock distribution etc). To develop a forecasting model one needs to choose some
approximation about the equilibrium, and enrich the dynamics of the model. Both
of these challenges we leave for future research.
In the absence of an empirical model, it is risky to make strong inferences
about the relationship in between the rigidity bias and specific historical
phenomena. However, to motivate future research, it may be useful to make
certain suggesting about the empirical relevance of the theory, based on intuition.
Firstly, we suggest that the rigidity bias could explain the classical boom-bust
cycle (Kindleberger 1989). The boom periods could be interpreted as periods of
stark ‘long-term visions’ and arrangements that permit commitment to them, with
insufficient regard for near term challenges related to their implementation. A
crisis occurs once aggregate risk is realised in the economy.
In a related vein we suggest that the rigidity bias might in part explain the
evolution of financial systems in the post-industrialisation period. Industrial
projects are typically long-term enterprises that require commitment by both the
entrepreneurs, and the financiers in the projects. Contingencies are varied and the
contracting environment may be very limited. The tentative conclusion from the
model is, then, that once such technology becomes available, people tend to invest
too much on it. Economies become too rigid, and macroeconomic shocks are too
costly from the social point of view. The frequency of financial crises in the
1800’s (Bordo 1990) could be symptomatic of such excess rigidity. The response
of economies to excess rigidity was the evolution of institutions of central banking
and financial regulation. In this way, the institutional and regulatory development
in the late 1800’s and 1900’s could perhaps be interpreted as a response to the
rigidity bias, a failure by the market mechanism to govern liquidity creation.25
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Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma L1.3
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The following shows that the counterhypothesis of this lemma leads to
contradiction with the premise that Z < 1:
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A similar proof can be utilised for the remaining part of L1.3.28
Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma L2
Consider average aggregate demand   
   
 
I
S , Z di i v
s dv v f r AD  for some  1 S Z    and
B 1 r R    . Average aggregate demand is continuous in S (see proof of
continuity below) and, by L1.3, it falls strictly below Z in the limit  Z S  . From
continuity, and this limit, it follows that there exists some   Z r S   such that
average aggregate demand is at or below Z in the set     r S , Z S . From L1.3 it
then follows, that average aggregate demand at r = 1 + B, must be strictly below Z
in that set. By continuity of the aggregate shock distribution, this set is not empty.
By the price mechanism, the average price of liquidity falls below 1 + B in the set
   r S , Z S . That the price of liquidity is at most 1 + B in all states, and below
1 + B in some states characterised by S > Z, establishes L2.
Proof of continuity:
Denote by   
   
 
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(A2.1)
By continuity of the distribution F of the average shock, the second terms on both
rows in (A2.1) vanish when e0. This establishes continuity of average aggregate
demand   
   
 
I
S , Z di i v
s dv v f r AD  wrt. S when 0 < Z < S  1 and R < r < 1 + B.29
Appendix 3
Proof of Lemma L3
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